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I.

Introduction
The OTP (Office of the Prosecutor) is interested in an overview of the law and practice of

the international criminal tribunals regarding motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the
Prosecution case. This is governed by Rule 167 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s rules. The
OTP is interested in the legal standards applied by the other tribunals that also provide for such
motions, as well as in the practice adopted, including whether the practice involves full briefing
by the parties or just oral argument.
The question of the law and practice surrounding a motion for judgment of acquittal at
the close of the prosecution’s case is ultimately a question of procedure. International criminal
procedure is generally the result of a mixing of styles between the adversarial and inquisitorial
approaches. The adversarial system is derived from the Anglo-American tradition of criminal
procedure. The inquisitorial system is developed from the European Continental tradition. These
approaches vary significantly and in international tribunals which have adopted elements of both
approaches this can create confusion.1
II.

Summary of Conclusions
The practice and standards of review applied by international criminal tribunals is mostly

dependent on what type of approach it applies to procedure. The ECCC and ICC are generally
courts that fit into the inquisitorial model. The STL, ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL more closely follow
the adversarial model.
The presentation of evidence in an inquisitorial system is determined by the presiding
judges. Therefore, there is no specific time for the close of the prosecution’s evidence. The ICC
does not have a procedure for a motion of acquittal except at the close of all evidence. The
ECCC does have a procedure that is analogous to an adversarial court, whereby the defense can
1

Safferling, International Criminal Procedure, p. 52-54.
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file a motion to the Co-investigating judges requesting an annulment of charges. If the Coinvestigating Judges at any time consider that any part of the proceedings is null and void they
may notify the Parties and submit a reasoned application to the Trial Chamber requesting
annulment.
The adversarial tribunals have a great deal of uniformity in the practice and standards of
review surrounding a motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecutor’s evidence. Generally,
the standard of review is that if the prosecution’s evidence is accepted without consideration of
its credibility and reliability, the tribunal must acquit if the evidence presented by the prosecution
at trial would be insufficient to prove the accused guilty of the charges listed on the indictment
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The practices of the ICTY and SCSL have replaced the practice of a written submission
with an oral argument. The SCSL, rather than a full brief, requires each party to submit a
skeleton argument in support of or in opposition to the motion. The ICTR continue the practice
of a full written submission. The change in procedure was seen as unfair to the accused by some
defense lawyers for the ICTY because of the great disparity in time between the length of the
prosecution evidence and the opportunity to prepare an adequate argument in support of the
brief. The defense lawyers for the SCSL did not resist the change in procedure believing that the
change in procedure would have little effect on the preparation of their arguments in support of
the brief. The change in procedure is believed to have shortened the length of time between the
close of the prosecution’s case to the beginning of the defense’s case in some trials.
When determining whether to replace a written submission of a motion for acquittal with
an oral submission, a court must consider weighing how seriously the rights of the accused are
affected against the degree to which the change in procedure enhances the efficiency of the court.

7

III.

Factual Background
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was inaugurated on March 1, 2009. Its primary

mandate is to hold trials for the people accused of carrying out the attack of February 14, 2005
which killed 22 people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, and
injured many others.2 The prosecutor also has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute persons
suspected to be responsible for crimes related to the Hariri attack that occurred in Lebanon
between October 1, 2004 and December 12, 2005. The Lebanese Parliament refused to cooperate
in drafting an agreement, so the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1757 to establish the
court. The UN Resolution remains the primary legal basis of the Tribunal.3
The law to establish the ECCC was passed by the Cambodian National Assembly in 2001
in order to investigate and prosecute crimes committed against the Cambodian people during the
Khmer Rouge, which was in power from April 7, 1975 to January 7, 1979. Cambodia wished to
invite international support for the court due to the international nature of the crimes, the
weakness of the Cambodian legal system, and the desire to meet international standards of
justice. The ECCC’s jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed between the beginning and end
of the Khmer Rouge’s time in power, and only to the party leadership and those believed to be
responsible for grave violations of Cambodian and international law.4
The ICC was created by the Rome Statute and entered into force on July 1, 2002. The
ICC has jurisdiction only over states that have ratified the Rome Statute, and only has
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the Treaty was brought into force in that jurisdiction.5
The ICC is limited to prosecuting “the most serious crimes of concern to the international

2

Safferling, 43-44
Id., 44
4
Id., 38-43
5
Rome Statute, Art. 11
3
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community as a whole…:” genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.6 The ICC is considered a court of last resort when a domestic law system is unable or
unwilling to prosecute heinous crimes.7
The ICTY is the oldest ongoing ad hoc international tribunal. The UN Security Council
established the tribunal in 1993 in order to investigate and prosecute war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed during the Balkan conflict that began in 1991. The ICTY has
jurisdiction for serious violations of international humanitarian law including grave breaches of
the Geneva Convention, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.8
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by agreement between the United
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on August 14, 2000. The tribunal had “the power to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30
November, 1996...” during the civil war.9 The Court was concerned with crimes against
humanity, violations of the Geneva Convention, and under Sierra Leonean law, violations of the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act of 1926, as well as other crimes.10 The SCSL has closed
proceedings, but the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone is still functioning.
The ICTR was founded in 1994 by UN Security Council Resolution 955. The court’s
jurisdiction covers serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda
and by Rwandan citizens in neighboring states between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.
The ICTR had the right to investigate and prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and
6

Id., Art. 5.1
Safferling, 47-52
8
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Articles 1-5
9
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 1
10
Id., Articles 2-5
7
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violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.11 Because the
genocide in Rwanda had so many perpetrators, the ICTR was focused only on prosecuting the
top-level planners.12
IV.

Legal Discussion
Every international criminal tribunal uses element of both the adversarial and

inquisitorial trial procedure. There are no juries in international tribunals, so the judges act as
both the trier of law and the trier of fact. This is a familiar disposition for judges that come from
an inquisitorial system. However, the international criminal tribunals also delegate more
authority to the lawyers for the respective parties than would an ordinary domestic inquisitorial
court. The procedures for a mid-trial motion for acquittal are deeply dependant on whether the
tribunal is closer in procedure to an adversarial or inquisitorial system.
A. Conflicts between adversarial and inquisitorial trial procedure
The primary difference between adversarial and inquisitorial trial procedure is the
preference for the delegation of decision making. The inquisitorial system tends to have firmer
rules put in place leaving less discretion to judges and prosecutors. Traits of the inquisitorial
system include centralized decision-making, rigid ordering of authority, and a preference for
determinative rules. At trial, the judge is very active and is responsible for calling and examining
witnesses. In this model, there is a stronger likelihood that judges sit on a panel rather than
individually.13
The adversarial model tends to afford judges and prosecutors more discretion. The
prosecutor has nearly complete discretion in how or whether to prosecute a case. It is the
responsibility of the attorneys to present evidence at trial. The judge tends to have a more passive
11

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Articles 1-4
Safferling, 28
13
Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 523-526
12
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role, acting as more of an umpire to make sure the action is fair. A major difference between the
models is that the adversarial model is more likely to use a lay jury to weigh the evidence. The
rules of evidence at trial rather than determining behavior of the institutional actors are used to
ensure a fair presentation of the evidence to a group of people not well-versed in the law.14
There are three elements that influence the development of criminal procedural law: (1)
the investigative element, (2) the procedural element, and (3) the judging element. The
inquisitorial and adversarial systems have a different aim in each of these elements.15 The
investigative element is about uncovering the truth of the matter. There are essentially two
conceptions of the truth at trial: that truth is external of the trial and needs to be determined by
the judges (“material truth”), and that truth is relative to the evidence presented at trial
(“procedural truth”). With judges controlling the presentation and evaluation of evidence,
inquisitorial courts seek the material truth. Adversarial courts, which typically use juries to
weigh evidence, seek procedural truth in order to prevent a verdict based on prejudicial or
confusing evidence. Likewise, there are two general aims of determining the procedural
parameters: protecting the defendant’s basic rights and presenting the evidence fairly.
Inquisitorial courts develop procedure that leans more towards protecting the rights of
defendants, whereas adversarial courts attempt to present the evidence in an unbiased manner.
Finally, the judging element is about whether the court leaves the question of guilt to a panel of
judges or to a group of lay jurors. In an inquisitorial system the judge or judges weigh the
evidence and determine guilt. In an adversarial system, where the presentation of evidence is
largely determined by the parties themselves, the purpose of procedural law is to present the

14
15

Id.
Safferling, 55
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procedural truth in fairness to the defendant so that a lay jury is not burdened with weighing
prejudicial or confusing evidence when determining guilt or innocence.16
International tribunals adopt a mixture of norms from the adversarial and inquisitorial
models. This can cause difficulties in creating procedural norms, especially at the trial stage as
this is the area where adversarial and inquisitorial models diverge most.17 The major
international crime tribunals are mostly designed as adversarial proceedings. This is the case in
the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC. Only the STL and ECCC more closely conform to the civil
law inquisitorial models that exist in their respective countries.18 However, more important to the
courts than the origin of a procedure are “whether it assists the tribunals in accomplishing tasks
and whether itit complies with fundamental fair trial standards.”19
B. Practices surrounding motions for acquittal and standards of review of the various
international tribunals
1. Special Tribunal for Lebanon
The STL adopts and incorporates Lebanese substantive law, which is based on a civil law
inquisitorial system. The STL however has adopted many procedural rules that are seen much
more frequently in common law systems. Like in adversarial trials, the prosecution first presents
its case in order to prove the charges set forth in the indictment. Unlike adversarial trials, victims
can participate in the proceedings as well. This means that the Trial Chamber may call further
evidence and witnesses at the request of victims who choose to participate in the proceedings.
Any evidence submitted by the prosecution or victims may be challenged by the defendant. Like
in an adversarial system, each party has a right to cross-examine any witness. Unlike a typical
16

Id., 54-57
Ambos, Kai, The Structure of International Criminal Procedure: ‘Adversarial’, ‘Inquisitorial’ or ‘Mixed’?, in:
Michael Bohlander, ed., International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures, 475
18
Pocar, Fausto & Linda Carter, The challenge of shaping procedures in international criminal courts, in: Linda
Carter Fausto Pocar, eds., International Criminal Procedure: The Interface of Civil Law and Common Law Legal
Systems, 27-30
19
Ambos, in Bohlander, ed., 500
17
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adversarial trial, but in line with every other international tribunals, there is no jury so
determination of the verdict rests solely with the judges.
After the close of the prosecution’s case the defense has an opportunity to move for a
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 167 of the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Rule
167 states that “[a]t the close of the prosecutor’s case, the Trial Chambers shall, by oral or
written decision and after hearing submissions of the Parties, enter a judgment of acquittal on
any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction on that count.” The STL is
relatively young and no cases have yet to reach the close of the Prosecution’s presentation of
evidence in any of its trials. However, this rule is modeled very closely on Rule 98 bis from the
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. For this reason the STL will likely follow the detailed
jurisprudence of the ICTY on the application of its Rule 98 bis.
2. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
The ECCC applies both Cambodian and international law.20 Cambodia is a civil law
society, but Rule 21.1(a) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules promises that the “proceedings shall be
fair and adversarial and preserve a balance between the rights of the parties.” Despite the
guarantee of an adversarial system, the Internal Rules lay out procedure in a fashion much closer
to an inquisitorial trial.21 The President of the Chambers controls all the proceedings. Rule 80
lays out how the preparation for the trial shall take place. The Co-Prosecutors submit a list of
witnesses, experts, and other evidence they intend to summon to trial. The Accused and Civil
Parties (victims) may submit a list of any additional witnesses they wish to summon.22
According to Rule 80 bis., at the Initial Hearing, the Chamber may reject a request for summons
based on whether each proposed witness or expert would be conducive to the good
20

Safferling, 38-43
Id., 41
22
Id., 41
21
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administration of justice. At the outset of the Substantive Hearing, according to Rule 91 bis.,
“[t]he President of the Trial Chamber shall determine the order in which the judges, the CoProsecutors and all other parties and their lawyers shall have the right to question the Accused,
the witnesses, experts and Civil Parties.”
Because the trial conforms more to inquisitorial standards rather than adversarial
standards, the ECCC does not actually have a time at which the Prosecution closes its case.
Instead, the Accused has an opportunity to at any time request the Trial Chamber to reduce the
scope of the trial pursuant to Rule 89 quater., which allows the Trial Chamber the authority to
exclude certain facts from the proceedings. If facts are excluded, any proceedings that stem from
charges in the indictment that relied on such facts must be terminated. Rule 76 also provides a
framework by which charges can be dismissed: if the Co-investigating Judges at any time
consider that any part of the proceedings is null and void they may notify the Parties and submit
a reasoned application to the Trial Chamber requesting annulment. The Parties may also submit a
reasoned application seeking annulment to the Co-investigating Judges. The standard of proof is
best laid out in Rule 76.4: “The Chamber may declare an application for annulment inadmissible
where the application: does not set out sufficient reasons; relates to an order that is open to
appeal; or is manifestly unfounded.”
These standards are illustrated in an appeal that the Co-Lawyers for Ieng Thirith
submitted alleging misconduct on the part of one of the Co-Investigating Judges. The CoLawyers alleged in an application seeking annulment to the Co-Investigating Judges that one of
them had demonstrated partiality against the Accused, had an impermissibly close relationship
with the Co-Prosecutors, and had attempted to block his Co-Investigating Judge from accessing
information relating to the trial. The Co-Lawyers sought to annul the entire investigation because
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their client’s rights had been so thoroughly violated as to taint the entire proceeding. All of the
evidence was based on contradictory hearsay and the Co-Investigating Judges dismissed the
application. The Co-Lawyers appealed, and the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the Internal Rules
do not allow for the Co-Investigating Judges to rule on the merits of an application. When
determining whether to seize the Chamber with an application seeking annulment, the CoInvestigating Judges should consider whether there is a reasoned application that there has been:
(1) a procedural defect; and (2) such defect infringes on the rights of the party making the
application.23 The standard of proof the Co-Investigating Judges should have used was simply
whether a prima facie case could be made. The Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed the application
seeking annulment on all counts because their chamber applies a much higher standard of proof:
“the applicant must prove the existence of a procedural defect that has harmed their interests in
order to satisfy the threshold for annulment.”24
It should also be noted that in the case of the ECCC, in the event a case is annulled due to
procedural defects, that would not foreclose the Tribunal from proceeding with a new
investigation untainted by defects.25 (Thirith Appeal, Par. 27)

3. International Criminal Court
The ICC uses an inquisitorial framework in its investigations. Being a court of limited
jurisdiction, there does not seem to be a procedure in place similar to the annulment procedure
from the ECCC. The decision to end the investigation rests solely with the Judges. The defense
23

Prosecutor v. Ieng, Pre-Trial Chamber, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 41)-D263/2/6, 25 June 2010, Decision
on Ieng Thirith’s appeal against the co-investigating judges’ order rejecting the request to seise the Pre-Trial
Chamber with a view to annulment of all investigations, para. 18
24
Id., para. 21
25
Id., para. 27.
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may submit a request to the Trial Chamber to make a final determination on the case based on
the evidence presented by the prosecution.26
Uhuru Kenyatta had been charged by the ICC with crimes against humanity for an
eruption of violence that occurred in December 2007 and January 2008 in the wake of his reelection. The Pre-Trial chamber upon examining the Prosecutor’s evidence confirmed the
charges and sent them to the Trial Chamber. After the charges were confirmed, three key
witnesses were either found to have made false statements or withdrew their intention to
testify.27 This request was simply submitted under the color of Article 67 of the Rome Statute
which provides for the rights of the accused.28 This includes the right to be tried without undue
delay as is specifically provided for in Art. 67.1(c). If the Judges find that the evidence presented
lacks sufficiency to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crimes,
they may order the Prosecution to either present new evidence or withdraw its charges against
the accused.29 (Kenyatta, withdrawal of charges by Prosecution). In any case, it is at the
discretion of the Judges to demand the close of the investigation and make a determination of
guilt. The standard of proof, as provided in Article 66.3 of the Rome Statute, is that the Court
must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
The trial phase of the ICTY is based on the adversarial model. This means that the
prosecution presents their evidence first, followed by the defense as provided in Rule 85 of the
26

Prosecution v. Kenyatta, Defence, ICC-01/09-02/11-945-Red, 10 September 2014, Defence Response to

‘Prosecution Notice Regarding the provisional trial date’ (ICC-01/09-02/11-944) and Request to Terminate the Case
Against Mr. Kenyatta.
27

Id., para. 5, 8, and 9
Id., para. 17
29
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, TC5(B), ICC-01/09-02/11-1005, 13 March 2015, Decision on the withdrawal of charges
28

against Mr. Kenyatta
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ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The prosecutors have more control over the presentation
of evidence than is seen in the ECCC. Each witness may be summoned for examination-in-chief,
cross-examination, and re-examination.30 The rules of evidence are also more indicative of an
adversarial system, allowing for the Trial Chamber to “exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”31 This is a typical prophylactic rule in
jury trial to prevent the jury from being unfairly prejudiced. However, there are no jury trials at
the ICTY as the verdict is determined by the Trial Chamber.
Rule 98 bis provides that “[a]t the close of the prosecutor’s case, the Trial Chamber shall,
by oral decision and after hearing oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgment of acquittal
on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction.” The standard of review
under Rule 98 bis is that the Trial Chamber must acquit in cases “to which, in the opinion of the
trial chamber, the prosecution evidence, if believed, is insufficient for any reasonable trier of fact
to find guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”32
The ICTY has gone into specific detail of exactly the test for whether there is evidence, if
accepted, on which the Trial Court could convict:33
1. “Where there is no evidence to sustain a charge, the Motion is to be
allowed. Although Rule 98 bis speaks of the sufficiency of evidence to
sustain a conviction on a charge, the Trial Chamber has, in accordance
with the practice of the Tribunal, considered the sufficiency of the
evidence as it pertains to elements of a charge, whether set out in separate
paragraphs or schedule items;
2. Where there is some evidence, but it is such that, taken at its highest, a
Trial Chamber could not convict on it, the Motion is to be allowed. This
will be the case even if the weakness in the evidence derives from the
weight to be attached to it, for example, the credibility of a witness. This is
in accordance with the exception to the general principle in common law

30

ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 85(B)
Id., Rule 89(D)
32
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, AC, IT-95-10-A, appeal judgment, para. 37
33
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, TC3, IT-02-54, 16 June 2004, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, para. 13.
31
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3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

jurisdictions that issues of credibility and reliability must be left to the jury
as the tribunal of fact.
Where there is some evidence, but it is such that its strength or weakness
depends on the view taken of a witness’s credibility and reliability, and on
one possible view of the facts a Trial Chamber could convict on it, the
Motion will not be allowed. This accords with the general principle in
common law jurisdictions that a judge must not allow a submission of no
case to answer because he considers the prosecution’s evidence to be
unreliable, since by doing that he would usurp the function of the jury as
the tribunal of fact.
The determination whether there is evidence on which a tribunal could
convict should be made on the basis of the evidence as a whole.
Whether evidence could lawfully support a conviction must obviously
depend on the applicable law of the Tribunal and the facts of each case.
The common law cannot be relied on to rule evidence as incapable of
supporting a conviction if on the basis of Tribunal jurisprudence the
evidence is to be considered as having that capacity. Thus hearsay
evidence, generally inadmissible in common law jurisdictions, is, pursuant
to Rule 89(C), admissible, the principal factor determining admissibility
being the reliability of the evidence. Once admitted, it is for a Trial
Chamber to determine the weight to be attached to hearsay evidence.
In view of the peculiarly common law origin of Rule 98bis, and the well
known difficulties to which its application has given rise in the work of
the Tribunal, the Trial Chamber considers it important to stress the point
made both in Prosecutor v. Kordic and Prosecutor v. Jelisic that a ruling
that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular
charge does not necessarily mean that the Trial Chamber will, at the end of
the case, return a conviction on that charge; that is so because the standard
for determining sufficiency is not evidence on which a
tribunal should convict, but evidence on which it could convict. Thus if,
following a ruling that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
on a particular charge, the Accused calls no evidence, it is perfectly
possible for the Trial Chamber to acquit the Accused of that charge if, at
the end of the case, it is not satisfied of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
When, in reviewing the evidence, the Trial Chamber makes a finding that
there is sufficient evidence, that is to be taken to mean that there is
evidence on which a Trial Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused.”

The procedure places the presiding judges of the Trial Court in a strange position because in the
ICTY, as in the other international tribunals, the judges serve as both the trier of fact and the trier
of law. In adversarial proceedings in domestic courts, the motion, also commonly referred to as
“no case to answer” rulings, gives the judge the authority to dismiss the case to protect the
18

accused from facing a jury when no reasonable trier of fact could convict. In this way, the Rule
98 bis motion demonstrates why the mixing of procedural frameworks can be difficult for
judges.34
The Rule 98 bis motion is limited in scope to assessing a judgment of acquittal based on
the prosecutor’s evidence at its best. The Trial Court is to take no consideration of evidence that
it anticipates the defense will present. Furthermore, a denial of a motion to acquit does not
remove the presumption of innocence. The denial of the Rule 98 bis motion only serves to
advance the trial to the presentation of the defense.35 Therefore, it is conceivable that the Trial
Court may deny a Rule 98 bis motion while accepting the prosecutor’s evidence without regard
to its reliability, but, without the defense presenting any new evidence, still acquit if it
determined the evidence to be unreliable at the close of the trial.
The ICTY amended Rule 98 bis on 8 December 2004 so that submissions of the parties
and the decisions of the judges are made orally. This was done in the interest of expediting the
proceedings. The text of Rule 98 bis read before the amendment read:36
“(A) An accused may file a motion for the entry of judgement of acquittal on
one or more offences charged in the indictment within seven days after the
close of the Prosecutor’s case and, in any event, prior to the presentation of
evidence by the defence pursuant to Rule 85 (A)(ii).
(B) The Trial Chamber shall order the entry of judgement of acquittal on
motion of an accused or proprio motu if it finds that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction on that or those charges.”
Under the previous version of the rule, the procedure was initiated by the defense counsel within
seven days of the close of the prosecutor’s case. In particularly complex cases, the defense would
be granted several extensions of time to accommodate the need to produce the written
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submissions. Furthermore, the prosecution would submit written motions in opposition, and the
judges would need to take all the submissions into consideration and issue written opinions.
Often the Rule 98 bis proceedings would take over 3 months to complete.37 (Prosecutor v. Oric,
transcript, Case No. IT-03-68-T, T. Ch. II, 4 May 2005, p. 7849) The amended Rule 98 bis was
aimed at making better use of the time of all parties.38 (Id., p. 7847-7862) Furthermore, the
amended procedure was initiated by the Trial Court rather than being initiated by the defense.
This simplified the procedure by requiring the Trial Court to acquit of its own volition if there is
no evidence to sustain a conviction rather than waiting for a submission from the defense.39
The decision to reduce the presentation of submissions of the parties for a judgment of
acquittal from written to oral was somewhat controversial. Defense attorneys believed that it
swayed the balance of the proceedings too far in favor of the prosecution. Under the amended
procedure, the defense counsel is provided relatively little time to prepare an oral motion after
the prosecution’s case-in-chief which may last one year or more. One defense attorney for the
ICTY said that there are situations in which it was in the best interest of the defendant to decline
to make an oral submission for acquittal. In regards to one case, the attorney stated: “We
believed it was unlikely that the chamber would be prepared to acquit or rule on the technical
aspects of a badly-presented case, which we wished to avoid.”40
5. Special Court for Sierra Leone
The SCSL is based mostly on the adversarial model. The SCSL Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provide in Rule 85 for the trial to proceed as most common law criminal proceedings
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with the prosecution first presenting its case followed by the defense and prosecution’s rebuttal.
Rule 89(B) provides that “the President, Designated Judge, or Chamber shall apply rules of
evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant
with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.” Furthermore, Rule 89(C) makes
all relevant evidence admissible. The Trial Chamber through Rule 93(A) may also admit
evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct that is relevant to serious violations of international
law. Rule 95 states that “[n]o evidence shall be admitted if its admission would bring the
administration of justice into serious disrepute.”
Rule 98 states that “[i]f, after the close of the case for the prosecution, there is no
evidence capable of supporting a conviction on one or more counts of the indictment, the Trial
Chamber shall, by oral decision and after hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a
judgment of acquittal on those counts.” The rule was amended to adopt the procedure used by
the ICTY Rule 98 bis.41 Despite misgivings by defense counsel at the ICTY, the change to oral
submissions in regards to a Motion for Acquittal resulted in better efficiency and sometimes
saved a great deal of time. The SCSL requires the defense counsel to submit a skeleton argument
that identifies and notifies in a clear and concise manner the specific issues of each count of the
indictment, as well as the legal arguments, that the defense intends to raise in their oral
submissions.42 Prior to the actual oral arguments, the prosecution has an opportunity to concede
that it failed to meet the standard of Rule 98 in any of the issues raised by the Defense in the
skeleton arguments. In the case adopting these standards, the defense even conceded “that the
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outcome of the Rule 98 proceedings [would] have little effect, if any, on the preparation of its
Defence case….”43
The length of time necessary to prepare submissions for a Rule 98 hearing may vary
widely depending on the complexity and duration of a case. At the ICTY, for the Oric case the
length of time between the close of the Prosecution’s evidence and the Trial Chamber’s ruling on
the motion was only eight days.44 At the SCSL, the Rule 98 motion on the Sesay, Kallon, Gbao
case mentioned above was argued two months after the prosecution closed its evidence.
The SCSL also incorporates the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR into its jurisprudence.
Article 20(3) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone advises that “the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the
International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.” The Trial Chamber has
ruled that although Article 20(3) only refers to the Appeals Chamber, the effect is felt by the
whole court. Thus, the Trial Chamber follows precedents set by the other international tribunals
in matters involving international law.45 Therefore, in regards to SCSL Rule 98 motions, the
Trial Chamber may use the jurisprudence set forth in the ICTY regarding standards of review.
6. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The presentation of evidence at the ICTR follows the adversarial model. “Examinationin-chief, cross-examination and re-examination shall be allowed in each case.”46 As is the case
with SCSL, the Rules of Evidence are very open and allow a great deal of material. The Trial
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Chamber may admit any evidence it deems to be relevant and to have probative value. The Rules
regulating the treatment of witnesses are more specific, but generally a great deal more evidence
is admitted than is common for domestic adversarial courts.
Rule 98 bis of the ICTR states: “If after the close of the case for the prosecution, the Trial
Chamber finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on one or more counts
charged in the indictment, the Trial Chamber, on motion of an accused filed within seven days
after the close of the Prosecutor’s case-in-chief… shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal
in respect of those counts.” In practice, the test is “whether a reasonable trier of fact could arrive
at a conviction if the Prosecution evidence is accepted…. [T]he sufficiency of the available
evidence should be determined without consideration of its credibility and reliability, which is to
be made at the end of the trial in light of all evidence adduced.”47
Although ICTR Rule 98 bis is worded differently than ICTY Rule 98 bis, the Trial
Chamber interprets the standards of review identical to ICTY. The ICTR even cites the ICTY in
its decisions under Rule 98 bis. Despite the slight divergence in language, the Trial Chamber has
referred to the respective rules as “substantially identical.”48
V.

Conclusions
Among the international criminal tribunals, there are many ways in which the procedure

surrounding the judgment for acquittal varies. The primary determinative factor is whether the
trial chamber is more closely linked to an adversarial or inquisitorial approach. Each tribunal
tends to mix aspects of both approaches. Among the tribunals that employ a more adversarial
approach, there is very little to distinguish the procedures. But among the tribunals that use an
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inquisitorial approach, where there is no clear close to the prosecution’s case, the acquittal
procedure can be raised in a novel fashion.
Among the international criminal tribunals, the ICC can be said to employ an approach
that is most closely aligned with a pure inquisitorial approach. Because of this, there is no close
to the prosecution’s evidence. The only standard applied is whether the accused has been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If at any time the Judges find the evidence insufficient to
sustain a conviction they can demand the prosecution either submit new evidence or withdraw
the charges. This contrasts significantly with the ECCC, which provides for annulment.
Although different in nature, the annulment procedure at the ECCC is analogous to the procedure
for acquittal used at the adversarial tribunals. The Trial Chamber may annul charges if it finds
that portion of the proceedings to be null and void. This gives the Trial Chamber the means to
move the proceeding along in the interest of judicial efficiency.
It may be necessary for the ECCC to have an additional measure over the ICC to protect
defendant’s rights. The ECCC has the power to prosecute crimes under both international law
and Cambodian law. This could potentially lead to great deal of charges being issued on an
indictment. With the ICC, such a safeguard may not be necessary because its jurisdiction is so
comparatively narrow. The ICC may only the most egregious violations of international law. As
such, if an ICC Judge is asked to acquit on a single charge he or she may be issuing a judgment
on the entire case.
The adversarial international tribunals have sufficient uniformity regarding the standards
of review for ruling on a motion to acquit at the close of the prosecutors case. For the ICTY, The
standard of review under Rule 98bis is that the Trial Chamber must acquit in cases “to which, in
the opinion of the trial chamber, the prosecution evidence, if believed, is insufficient for any
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reasonable trier of fact to find guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”49 The SCSL
has adopted the same standard. The ICTR uses a nearly identical standard, adding that the in
practice the test is “whether a reasonable trier of fact could arrive at a conviction if the
Prosecution evidence is accepted…. [T]he sufficiency of the available evidence should be
determined without consideration of its credibility and reliability, which is to be made at the end
of the trial in light of all evidence adduced.”50
The adversarial international tribunals also have more uniformity in their practice
surrounding a motion for judgment of acquittal. Each tribunal allows for a submission by the
defense at the close of the Prosecution’s case. The practice surrounding this procedure varies
slightly because of the change adopted by the ICTY, and subsequently by the SCSL, which
replaced the requirement for written submissions by the parties with a strictly oral submission.
Defense attorneys for the ICTY felt that the amended procedure was unfair to their clients. The
prosecution would present a case that could sometimes last for more than a year. Several of the
defense attorneys felt that the change rendered the procedure useless, and at least one attorney
felt that it might be in the client’s best interest not to make an oral submission at all.51 Despite
the protests of defense attorneys at the ICTY, the amended rules were accepted and embraced by
SCSL lawyers. SCSL defense lawyers believed that the changes to oral submissions would
change very little in the way they built their case. Furthermore, they believed that preparing an
oral submission rather than a written submission would actually save time that could be better
spent preparing the defense’s case. The skeleton outline that is required for the oral submission is
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in effect the same as a full written submission, but is less burdensome on the attorneys. After the
adoption of the oral submissions amendment in the ICTY, the SCSL noted several cases that
advanced much more quickly. This was more of an exception rather than a norm, but the SCSL
defense attorney noted that the preparation of their defense case was not substantially affected by
the amended procedure.52
The most significant factor in determining procedure for any tribunal is the structure of
the court. Each international tribunal incorporates some elements of both the adversarial and
inquisitorial models, though each tribunal also generally leans closer to one method of
procedure. The ECCC and ICC are much more strongly reflect an inquisitorial model, while the
STL, ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL reflect an adversarial model. The procedure of acquittal during the
course of the trial varies among the ECCC and ICC, but the procedure and standards of review
are very consistent throughout the adversarial courts. But when considering an amendment to the
rules of procedure, the court should ask whether its policy goals would be met through amending
the procedure: protecting the defendants’ basic rights and presenting evidence in a fair manner.
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